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The Misnamed Tax: The Crude Oil
Windfall Profits Tax of 1980
Douglas M. Robison*
I. Introduction
On April 2, 1980, the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act (Act)
was signed into law by President Carter.' The most complex and
controversial provisions of this Act imposed an excise tax on most
domestic crude oil production.2 This article focuses on the excise tax
provisions of the Act in order to explain and illustrate their operative
effects.
II. Excise Not Excess
The tax imposed on the oil industry is not a tax on profits.4 In
* B.A., Bucknell University; J.D. Villanova University 1980; Law Clerk for U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Barron McCune.
i. See Pittsburgh Press, Apr. 2, 1980, at A-6, col.
2. SENATE CO. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON THE CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFITS TAX ACT
OF 1979, S. REP. No. 96-394, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 180-81 (1979) (additional views of Senator
Wallop) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. Senator Wallop states that the Crude Oil
Windfall Profits Tax Act is a "maddening structural complexity" that will result in "costly
administrative burdens for both government and industry." Id Independent observers have
also described the Act as "complex." NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 1980, at 67 (notes that the windfall
profits tax has already been dubbed the "Lawyers and Accountants Relief Act of 1980").
The controversial nature of the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax is evidenced by the inordi-
nate amount of congressional debate that took place on the enactment of the tax. See - CONG.
REC. S 16845-18866 (daily eds. Nov. 16, 1979 through Dec. 17, 1979). President Carter called
its enactment "good news for the country . . . and the whole world." NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7,
1980, at 67. The Wall Street Journal, however, referred to the windfall profits tax act as a
"misguided piece of legislation" that could only be the result of a "death of reason," Wall
Street Journal, Mar. 27, 1980, at 26, col. _.
The windfall profits tax does not apply to all categories of oil production. Types of oil
exempt from the tax include: (1) oil produced overseas, I.R.C. § 4991(a); (2) front-end tertiary
oil, id § 4991 (b)(4); (3) oil produced by state and local government, id. § 4994(a); (4) oil pro-
duced by Indian tribes, id § 4994(d); (5) certain qualifying charitable organizations, id
§ 4994(b); and Alaskan oil not produced in the Sadlerochit Reservoir in Prudhoe Bay nor less
than seventy-five miles from the Alaskan pipeline; id. § 4994(e).
The exemption for tertiary oil only applies to independent producers, id § 4994(c), and
even then only to a limited extent, id §4994(c)(3)(B).
3. For an indepth discussion of the various provisions of the Crude Oil Windfall Profits
Tax Act of 1980 [hereinafter referred to as the Act], see notes 39-111 and accompanying text
infra.
4. SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 181 (additional views of Senator Wallop); id. at
fact the tax bears only a minimal correlation to oil company profits
because the windfall profits tax is really an excise tax.' As an excise
tax the windfall profits tax is, in essence, a colossal sales tax.6
A true windfall profits tax levies on the generation of those prof-
its that exceed some statutorily determined reasonable level.7 In the
165-66 (additional views of Senator Dole); - CONG. REC. E 3406-07 (daily ed. June 29, 1979)
(remarks of Rep. Dannemeyer); id. at S 10694 (daily ed. July 26, 1979) (remarks of Senator
Dole); id. at S 16845 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979) (remarks of Senator Dole); id at S 18866 (daily
ed. Dec. 17, 1979) (remarks of Senator McClure).
The so-called windfall profits tax is not really a tax on profits because it is actually an
excise tax. Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-235, § 4986 (codified at
I.R.C. § 4986). Section 4986 provides, "An excise tax is hereby imposed on the windfall profit
from taxable crude oil .. d. " I  (emphasis added). See also HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, REPORT ON H.R. 3919: THE CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFITS TAX OF 1979, H.R. REP.
No. 96-304. 96th Cong.. 1st Sess., 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; SENATE RE-
PORT. sidpra note I. at 2.
Because the windfall profits tax is an excise tax, a strong possibility exists that an oil
producer operating under a financial loss position must still pay the windfall profits tax. See -
CONG. REC. S 17496 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1979) (remarks of Senator McClure); id. at S 17134
(daily ed. Nov. 27, 1979) (remarks of Senator Bellmon); id at H 6889 (daily ed. July 30, 1979)
(remarks of Rep. Duncan). Responding to this anomaly, Senator Bellmon said, "This so-
called windfall profit tax is not a tax on profits at all. . . . A producer of oil could very well
pay a heavy tax and actually lose money and have no profits of any kind." Id at S 17134
(daily ed. Nov. 27, 1979). Furthermore, Senator McClure stated,
Once enacted the windfall profit tax will be in place even if the industry's profit in
subsequent years is more moderate. And since the tax measure before us is actually
an excise tax - and not a tax on profits - it will be collected even if the industry's
profits were to vanish.
Id. at S 17496 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1979).
In recognition of this possibility, the Act provides that the taxable windfall profit on any
barrel of crude oil is limited to its prorata share of ninety percent of the net income of the oil
producing property from which it came. Pub. L. No. 96-233, § 4988(b) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 4988(b)). For further discussion of the efficacy of this limitation, see note 89 and accompa-
nying text infra.
5. See note 4 supra.
6. See HOUSE REPORT, note 4 supra, at 84 (additional views of Rep. Rousselot); -
CONG. REC. E 3406-07 (daily ed. June 29, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Dannemeyer); id. at S 17481
(daily ed. Nov. 29, 1979) (remarks of Senator Armstrong). Representative Dannemeyer states
that the windfall profits tax "is an excise tax, a sales tax, the most regressive tax imaginable
... "" Id at E 3405-07 (daily ed. June 29, 1979). Senator Armstrong states: "What we have
here is, basically, a sales tax." Idat S 17481 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1979).
The Congressmen are correct in their characterization of the windfull profits tax as a sales
tax. A sales tax is a tax on the sale of an item of personal property usually measured by a price
percentage. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2003 1966). Similarly, the
windfall profits tax is levied on the sales price of each barrel of domestically produced oil less
some statutory adjustments. See note 37 infra.
7. See REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ENERGY TAXATION:
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE TAXATION OF INCREASED DOMESTIC OIL AND GAS PROFITS, 93d
Cong.. 2d Sess., 2-12 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as the STAFF REPORT OF 19741.
The STAFF REPORT OF 1974 discusses, in great detail, the differences between a true ex-
cess profits tax and an excise windfall profits tax. A true excess profits tax is described as a tax
"that would be imposed on corporate earnings in excess of earnings during a base period, plus
an allowance for new investment." Id at 3. Accord HEARINGS ON THE ENACTMENT OF A
"WINDFALL" OR EXCESS PROFITS TAX BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., 140-41 (statement of George Schultz) [hereinafter referred to as the
HOUSE HEARINGS OF 1974]. George Schultz stated that a "classic excess profits tax" would
have the following elements:
(i) a determination of profit in excess of some base amount, (ii) the application of a
high rate of tax to the excess amount, and (iii) complex exceptions designed to allevi-
ate the penal nature of the high tax rate in situations in which the general rule deter-
mination of excess profits yielded an inequitable result.
past several congressional proposals were introduced in order to
make any windfall profits tax imposed on the oil industry a true ex-
cess profits tax.8 These proposals have usually taxed profits in excess
of the amount necessary to generate a specified rate of return on cap-
ital at a very high rate.9
Congress, however, structured the present windfall profits tax as
an excise tax rather than a true excess profits tax' ° because the price
Id
The major argument for the enactment of a true excess profits tax is "that it focuses di-
rectly on the problem - the excess profits themselves. Thus, assuming that normal profits can
be accurately defined, the tax would be paid only by taxpayers who actually did have excessive
profits. ... STAFF REPORT OF 1974, supra at 5.
The major arguments against the enactment of a true excess profits tax are: (1) such a tax
becomes too complicated when provisions are enacted to insure against inequitable applica-
tion; (2) it is difficult to distinguish between normal profits and excess profits; and (3) the tax
only applies to corporations because it is too difficult to apply to partnerships and individuals.
Id at 4-5; HOUSE HEARINGS OF 1974, supra, at 140-41 (statement of George Schultz); id at
308-09 (statement of Walker Winter on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce).
Mr. Winter stated that any attempt to define excess profit will necessarily be arbitrary. Id
at 309. Mr. Winter, however, then identified two methods by which to distinguish normal
profits from excess profits. Id One method compares current earnings to base period earnings.
The other method computes the relationship of current earnings to invested capital and taxes
all future earnings to the extent that they exceed this return on investment ratio. Id. Allegedly,
both methods have flaws. The return on invested capital formula is supposedly inequitable
because it does not take risks into account. The higher the risk, the higher the rate of return
that can be justified. Id The base period formula is supposedly inequitable because a com-
pany with poor profitability is subject to a high tax penalty if it suddenly becomes profitable
since its relatively low base period earnings are based on the company's past poor perform-
ance. Id
Contrary to Mr. Winter's opinion, an equitable formula for distinguishing normal profits
from excess profits can be devised. See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
8. See - CONG. REC. S 17485 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1979) (amendment No. 849 to the
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1979, introduced by Senator McClure); HOUSE HEAR-
INGS OF 1974, supra note 7, at 13-80; PROPOSED ENACTMENT OF AN ENERGY WINDFALL
PROFITS TAX: HEARINGS ON SECTION 110 OF S. 2589 BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1974). For an indepth discussion and comparative analysis
of different types of true excess profits bills, see HousE HEARINGS OF 1974, supra note 7, at
479-88 (statement of W.L. Henry on behalf of the American Petroleum Institute).
9. See HOUSE HEARINGS OF 1974, supra note 7, at 479-88.
10. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4; - CONG.
REC. S 16841 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979) (statement of Senator Long). The rationale behind the
enactment of the windfall profits tax is that upon decontrol of domestic oil prices the oil indus-
try will reap excessive profits. 1d The oil companies' profits will be excessive since domestic
oil will be sold at the unreasonably high world market price set by the OPEC cartel. Id
Accordingly, the amount of profit attributable to the differential between the uncontrolled
price of oil and the controlled price of oil is "an appropriate object of taxation." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. Explaining the need for the tax, Senator Russell Long stated,
[L]ast April the President announced his program to remove price controls from do-
mestic crude oil.
The recent price increases of the OPEC cartel, however, mean that decontrol will
result in large increases in oil industry profits. If the entire rise in oil prices resulting
from decontrol is allowed to remain with the oil producers, the American public may
not accept decontrol. The President, therefore, as part of his decontrol program, pro-
posed a windfall profits tax on oil producers to recapture some of these revenues.
_CONG. REC. S 16841 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979). See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 76
(additional views of Rep. Fisher). Representative Fisher states that the most prudent course of
congressional action is to "levy a tax on increased oil company revenues resulting from decon-
trol, and to use those revenues to finance research and development of alternative energy
sources." Id
of most domestically produced oil is currently subject to controls"
that will soon be lifted, allowing the oil industry to reap excessive
profits.' 2 The tax, therefore, recaptures a large portion of these fu-
ture excessive profits and uses these revenues for public purposes,
taxing the difference between the former ceiling price of domestic
crude oil and the higher market price obtainable upon decontrol.
13
III. The Price Regulations
Since the windfall profits tax is imposed on the price differential
that will exist between the controlled and the uncontrolled price of
oil, an understanding of the Act first requires an understanding of
the present system of price regulation.' 4 For example, the Act often
11. The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976), as
amended by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871,
and the Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat. 1125,
regulates the price of domestically produced oil. The dispositive provisions of the law are
actually contained in federal regulations because the power to formulate price controls is ex-
plicitly delegated to the President. 15 U.S.C. § 757 (1976). See 10 C.F.R. §§ 212.1-.188 (1980)
(price regulations issued pursuant to the federal statute). For a discussion of the price regula-
tions, see notes 14-36 and accompanying text infra.
Presently, approximately 70% of domestic oil production is subject to price controls. RE-
PORT OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3919, H.R.
3421, AND H.R. 3474 RELATING TO WINDFALL PROFIT TAXES, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 5 (1979)
[hereinafter referred to as the STAFF REPORT OF 19791. Because the United States imports 43%
of its oil supply, price regulated oil constitutes about 40% of domestic oil consumption. Id
12. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE WINDFALL PROFITS TAX: A COMPARA-
TIVE ANALYSIS OF Two BILLS 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE]. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that as a result of decontrol the oil industry
would reap an additional $831.8 billion in revenues over the next ten years. Id. at xvii.
Although decontrol may result in an estimated $831.8 billion in additional oil industry
revenue, considerable controversy exists regarding whether the profits of the oil industry are in
fact excessive. Compare HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 81 (additional views of Representa-
tives Conable, Duncan, Archer, et al) and SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 147-49 (additional
views of Senator Gravel) with - CONG. REC. S 16851-54 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979) (remarks of
Senator Metzenbaum) and - CONG. REC. § 17173-74 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1979) (remarks of
Senator Metzenbaum).
It is argued that oil company profits are not excessive because on an historical basis the
rate of return on investment in the oil industry is reasonable, being lower than the rate of
return in the drug industry and office equipment industry. See HOUSE REPORT,Supra note 4, at
81; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 147-49. It is argued, however, that the excessiveness of
the oil industry profits is evidenced by the exceptional cash-flow (liquidity) in the industry,
which is generated through the utilization of such preferential accounting techniques as "suc-
cessful efforts costing" and Lifo inventory valuation. See - CONG. REC. S 16851-54 (daily ed.
Nov. 16, 1979); . CONG. REC. S 17173-74 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1979). Furthermore, on the basis
of the 1979 third quarter profits reported by the eighteen largest oil companies, the industry
rate of return on investment averages approximately 23%, which is exceptionally high. See -
CONG. REC. S 16853 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979).
13. See note 10 supra.
14. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 82 (additional views of Representatives Con-
able, Duncan, Archer, et al.); - CONG. REC. S 16857 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979) (remarks of
Senator Wallop). Representatives Conable, Duncan, and Archer state,
The complexities of this tax are such that the bureaucrats who now reside at the
Department of Energy would simply be transferred lock, stock, and barrel (as well as
regulation booklet) to the Department of Treasury. Theprice regulations which have
been held in such wide disrepute will be perpetuated through this tax.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 82 (additional views of Representatives Conable, Duncan,
and Archer) (emphasis added).
makes explicit cross-references to the Department of Energy (DOE)
price control regulations when defining the various categories of oil
production and the tax treatment each category receives.' 5
Under the DOE price control regulations, domestic oil produc-
tion is divided into three tiers: 6 "lower tier oil," receiving the lowest
price;7 "upper tier oil," receiving a higher price;' 8 and third tier oil,
which is not subject to price controls.' 9
Generally, lower tier oil is composed of most oil produced from
a property on which production commenced before 1973.20 The vol-
15. See note 2 supra and note 43 and accompanying text infra.
16. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 212.1-.79 (1980). See also STAFF REPORT OF 1979 supra note 11, at
5-12; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 16-31; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30-5 1. Lower
tier oil is defined as oil produced at a volume equal to or below the base production control
level (BPCL) of a property, while upper tier oil is defined as oil produced in excess of the
BPCL of a property. STAFF REPORT OF 1979 supra note I1, at 5; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4,
at 16; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30.
Until June of 1979 the BPCL of a property was equal to the volume of oil produced on
that property in either 1972 or 1975, whichever was less. Id. In June of 1979, however, oil
producers were given the option of having the BPCL of a property equal the average daily oil
production of the property for the six months ending March 31, 1979. If an election was made
the BPCL was lowered through the implementation of a statutory decline curve at a rate of
1.5% a month. See STAFF REPORT OF 1979, supra note 1I, at 8-9; HOUSE REPORT, supra note
4, at 16-17; SENATE REPORT supra note 4, at 30-31; 10 C.F.R. § 212.72(c) (1980). As of Janu-
ary I, 1980, the BPCL of a property is lowered at a rate of 3% per month regardless of whether
a producer elected to redetermine the BPCL of his property in June of 1979. Id.
Given the definition of BPCL, it is easy to see that lower tier oil would be composed of
most oil produced from a property that first began production before 1972. HousE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 16; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30. Moreover, upper tier oil would be
composed of oil produced from properties that first commenced production after 1972, which
would include oil produced in the Prudhoe Bay region of Alaska. See HOUSE REPORT supra
note 4, at 20; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 34. Properties that first began production in
1972 would have a BPCL of zero, and, thus all production from such properties would be
upper tier production. Id
Lower tier oil constitutes approximately 36% of domestic oil production, or about 21% of
domestic oil consumption. STAFF REPORT OF 1979, supra note 1I, at 6. Upper tier oil repre-
sents about 20% of domestically consumed oil and about 34% of domestic oil production. Id
Although no formal third tier exists, certain categories of oil are exempt from price con-
trols. These categories include the following: incremental crude oil produced from qualified
tertiary enhanced recovery projects, 10 C.F.R. § 212.78 (1980); oil produced from "stripper
well properties," id. § 212.54; and newly discovered oil, id. § 212.79. For definitions of such
terms as "stripper well property," "tertiary enhanced recovery project," and "newly discov-
ered" oil, see notes 31-33 and accompanying text infra.
17. See 10 C.F.R. § 212.73, § 212.77 (1980). The ceiling price oflower tier oil is equal to
the sum of: (1) the highest posted field price for that grade of oil on May 15, 1973; (2) $1.35 a
barrel; and (3) certain adjustments for inflation. Id. On May 1979 the ceiling price for lower
tier oil was estimated at $5.91 a barrel. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 34. For a definition
of "lower tier oil" see note 16 supra.
18. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 35. As of May 1979 the ceiling price for upper
tier oil was estimated at $13.02 per barrel. Id The ceiling price for upper tier oil is the highest
posted field price for that grade of oil on September 30, 1975, plus certain adjustments for
inflation less $1.32 per barrel. 10 C.F.R. § 212.74, § 212.77 (1979). See also STAFF REPORT OF
1979, supra note 11, at 6; HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 20; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at
35.
19. See REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE WINDFALL PROFITS
TAX: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF Two BILLS 5 (1979). The Congressional Budget Office
estimated that the price of uncontrolled oil averaged approximately $27.50 in November 1979.
Id The price of oil has since risen. For a discussion of what constitutes "uncontrolled oil," see
notes 31-36 infra.
20. See note 16 supra.
ume of lower tier oil on a producing property is determined by com-
puting the base production control level (BPCL) of a property.2'
Until recently, the BPCL was usually the lesser of: (1) the average
daily amount of oil produced from the property in 1972, or (2) the
average daily amount of lower tier oil produced in 1975.22 Oil pro-
duced below the BPCL is lower tier oil23 while that produced in ex-
cess of the BPCL is upper tier oil.
24
Under the DOE price regulations upper tier oil is comprised of
four major types:25  (1) oil produced on a property in excess of the
BPCL of that property; 26 (2) oil produced on a property on which
production commenced after 1972 but before 1979;27 (3) oil pro-
duced from the Sadlerochit Reservoir on the Prudhoe Bay area of
the Alaskan North Slope; 28 and (4) oil produced on "marginal
properties. Property qualifies as a "marginal property" if the
quantity of oil produced falls within the amount set for that well
depth; the deeper the well, the more barrels the property can produce
and still be classified as marginal.
31
Third tier oil, which is exempt from price controls, consists of
oil produced from a stripper well property,3' oil produced through





25. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text infra.
26. See note 16 supra.
27. See id.
28. See id
29. See 10 C.F.R. § 212.72 (1979). A property is marginal if the average daily produc-
tion per well and the average completion depths of all the producing wells on the property,
meet the following criteria:
Table
Average completion depth barrels
in feet per day
2,000 but less than 4,000 20 or less
4,000 but less than 6,000 25 or less
6,000 but less than 8,000 30 or less
8,000 or more 35 or less
Id On January 1, 1980, the BPCL of marginal properties was reduced to zero. Id All produc-
tion from marginal properties is therefore entitled to receive the upper tier price. Id
30. See note 29 supra.
31. See 10 C.F.R. § 212.54 (1979). A "stripper well property" is defined as a property
"whose average daily production of crude oil ... per well did not exceed 10 barrels per day
during any preceding consecutive 12 month period beginning after December 31, 1972." 10
C.F.R. § 212.54 (1979). Oil produced on stripper well property is specifically exempt from
price controls. Id
32. 10 C.F.R. § 212.78 (1979). Tertiary oil is that additional amount of oil produced
from a property through the implementation or expansion of a qualified tertiary recovery pro-
ject that would not have been produced if only previous oil recovery methods employed on the
property were used. 10 C.F.R. § 212.78 (1978). A qualified tertiary recovery project is one that
involves one or more specified fluid, gaseous, or chemical recovery techniques that would be
certifiably uneconomic at the ceiling prices imposed by the DOE pricing regulations. Id
33. 10 C.F.R. § 212.79 (1979). Newly discovered oil is defined as oil that is produced
from a property on which no crude oil was produced in calendar year 1978. Id. at § 212.79.
per well property is property on which the wells, on the average,
produce ten or less barrels of oil a day.34 Tertiary recovery involves
the production of oil by forcing the oil up a well through the injec-
tion into the ground of various chemical, gaseous, or fluid solu-
tions.3 5  Newly discovered oil is that discovered after January 1,
1979.36
IV. The Excise Tax on Major Oil Producers
The windfall profits tax on each barrel of domestically produced
oil is computed by multiplying the amount of "windfall profit" by
the "applicable percentage. ' 37 For large integrated oil companies
the applicable percentage, or tax rate, is either sixty percent, seventy
percent, or thirty percent, depending upon the category of oil being
taxed.3" The seventy percent excise tax is imposed on tier one oil.39
Tier one oil is oil that would be classified as upper tier or lower tier
oil under the DOE price regulations.4" The sixty percent excise tax is
imposed on tier two oil,4 which is defined as any oil produced from
a "stripper well property" or a "National Petroleum Reserve."42 The
34. For a discussion of the term "stripper well property" see note 31 supra.
35. See note 32 supra.
36. See note 33 supra.
37. I.R.C. § 4987(a). See also Temp. Reg. § 150.4987-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980).
See also CONFERENCE COMM., REPORT ON THE CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFIT TAX ACT OF
1980, REP. No. 96-817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 92 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as the CONFER-
ENCE COMMITTEE REPORT]. The Conference Committee Report states that the windfall profits
tax "equals the tax rate times the taxable windfall profit, which equals the selling price of the
oil minus an adjusted base price and minus a deduction for State severance taxes on the wind-
fall profit." Id at 92.
For a discussion on the term "applicable percentage," see note 38 and accompanying text
infra. For a discussion on the term "windfall profit," see notes 47-52 infra.
38. I.R.C. § 4987(b). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4987-l, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980). For
a discussion on the tax rate applied to each category of oil, see notes 39-44 and accompanying
text infra.
The temporary regulations define an integrated oil company as a "taxpayer that both
produces oil and is either a 'retailer' or a 'refiner.'" Temp. Reg. 150.4996. l(g), at 45 Fed. Reg.
23396 (1980). A retailer is defined as someone who sells oil or natural gas througb-a retail
outlet operated as a franchise or through a retail outlet owned directly by the producer. Id. A
refiner is an entity that refines more than 50,000 barrels of crude oil on any given day. Id
39. I.R.C. § 4987(b). Tier one oil is defined as any oil which is not tier two or tier three
oil. Id § 4991(c). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4991-1(b), at 45 Fed. Reg. 23388 (1980). With this
nebulous definition, the legislative history of the Act must be examined to determine what is
meant by the term "tier one oil." The Conference Committee Report states that tier one oil is
essentially any oil taxed in either tier one or tier two of the Senate version of the windfall
profits tax. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 92-93. The first two tax tiers
of the Senate bill, however, primarily consisted of oil that would be classified as lower tier oil
and upper tier oil under the DOE price control system. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at
29; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUMMARY OF H.R. 3919, THE CRUDE OIL
WINDFALL PROFITS TAX ACT 3 (Nov. 6, 1979). Thus, tier one oil, as defined by the Act, is
composed of upper tier and lower tier oil as defined by the DOE price regulations. For a
discussion on upper tier and lower tier oil as defined by the DOE regulations, see notes 16-36
supra.
40. See note 39 supra.
41. I.R.C. § 4987(b). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4987-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980).
42. I.R.C. § 4991(d). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4991-1(b), at 45 Fed. Reg. 23388 (1980).
term "stripper well property" has the same definition under the Act
as it does under the DOE price regulations.43 Tier three oil," which
is composed of newly discovered oil, incremental tertiary oil, and
heavy oil is taxed at a thirty percent rate.45
The amount of per barrel profit, which can be classified as a
windfall, is calculated as follows: the sales price per barrel of oil less
the "adjusted base price" and less a state severance tax adjustment.46
The term "adjusted base price" means the base price of the barrel of
crude oil multiplied by an inflation adjustment.47 The base price per
barrel of oil varies among the oil tiers.48
See notes 31 & 34 and accompanying text supra (discussion of how the term "stripper well
property" is defined under the price control regulations).
43. I.R.C. § 4991(d). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4991-1(b), at 45 Fed. Reg. 22388 (1980).
See notes 31 & 34 and accompanying text supra (definition of "stripper well property" under
the DOE regulations).
44. I.R.C. § 4987(b)(3). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4987-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980).
45. I.R.C. § 4991(e). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4991-1(b), at 45 Fed. Reg. 23388 (1980).
Newly discovered oil has the same meaning under the Act as it does under the pricing
regulations. See notes 32 & 35 and accompanying text supra. Incremental tertiary oil is de-
fined similarly to the definition of tertiary oil employed in the DOE regulations. I.R.C. § 4993.
See also notes 31 & 34 and accompanying text supra.
The tax on newly discovered oil has been severely criticized as contrary to the whole
rationale underlying the windfall profits tax. See - CONG. REC. S 18179 (daily ed. Dec. 11,
1979) (remarks of Senator Dole). Senator Dole stated,
The proposed windfall tax is an excise tax that is intended to reduce inventory profits
generated by decontrol and OPEC price increases. Regardless of what one thinks
about this basic rationale, it is clear that the rationale does not apply to newly discov-
ered oil. How can one have an inventory profit on oil which has not yet been discov-
ered? Obviously there can be no inventory profit under these circumstances and it
makes no sense to impose any form of windfall profits tax on such discoveries.
Id The tax on newly discovered oil has also been criticized on the grounds that it ignores "a
fundamental, direct relationship between the price of oil, the number of wells drilled, and the
oil and gas produced." Id. at S 18479-80 (remarks of Senator Schmitt). Drilling activity in-
creases as a higher rate of return, resulting from a higher price, is received. Id If most of the
price increase is taxed away drilling activity will not expand, and the discovery of new oil
reserves will be slowed. Id
In addition, the placing of a windfall profits tax, even at a relatively low rate, on incre-
mental tertiary oil has been similarly criticized. See id. at S 18179 (remarks of Senator Dole);
id at S 18181-82 (remarks of Senator Bentsen). Senator Dole stated:
[lit makes no sense to impose a minimum tax on incremental tertiary produc-
tion. . . . The Office of Technology Assessment has estimated that with oil priced at
$22 per barrel tertiary methods could add between 25 billion and 42 billion barrels of
oil to existing domestic reserves, this would translate into an additional 900,000 to 1.3
million barrels per day by 1990.
The Finance Committee recognized that tertiary recovery methods are extremely
costly and involve relatively unproven technologies. If additional taxes are imposed
on tertiary projects, they will not be initiated.
Id at S 19179. But see id at S 18185 (remarks of Senator Muskie); id at S 18187 (remarks of
Senator Moynihan); Id at S 18189 (remarks of Senator Bradley).
Heavy oil is oil that has a high viscosity [a weighted gravity of 16 degrees API or less).
I.R.C. § 4991(e)(3). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4991-1(b) (1980). Heavy oil is a thick tar-like
substance that literally has to be mined from the earth. - CONG. REC. S 18408-10 (daily ed.
Dec. 13, 1979) (remarks of Senator Bellmon).
46. I.R.C. § 4988. See also Temp. Reg. 150.4981-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980).
47. I.R.C. § 4989(a). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4981-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980).
48. 45 Fed. Reg. 23385 (1980). The base price for tier one oil is the price per barrel of
upper tier oil in May 1979 reduced by twenty-one cents. I.R.C. § 4989(c). See also Temp. Reg.
150.4989-1(b), at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980). Applying this formula, the Internal Revenue
Service has determined that the base price for tier one oil is $11.01. 45 Fed. Reg. 23385 (1980).
The base price of each of these three oil tiers is termed "ad-
justed" because the base prices are adjusted for inflation on a quar-
terly basis.49 The inflation adjustment for tier one and tier two oil
equals the percentage by which the Gross National Product price
deflator for the second preceding calendar quarter exceeds the defla-
tor for the calendar quarter ending June 30, 1979.50 The inflation
adjustment for tier three oil is similar but slightly more compli-
cated.5' The state severance tax adjustment is computed by deduct-
ing from the sales price of a barrel of oil those state severance taxes
attributable to the difference between the actual selling price of the
oil and the adjusted base price of that oil, provided that the state
severance tax does not exceed fifteen percent.52
Given the statutory definition of tier one, tier two, and tier three
oil and the meaning of the terms "windfall profit" and "applicable
percentage," the excise tax imposed on domestic oil produced by ma-
jor companies becomes relatively easy to compute. For example, as-
suming a world market price of $30 per barrel, 53 a state severance
tax of 12.5%,"0 and the current annual inflation rate,55 the windfall
It is arguable that in determining the present tier one base price of $11.01 the I.R.S. is
exceeding its statutory authority. The I.R.S. predicated its base price determination on the
lowest May 1979 upper tier ceiling price. The Conference Committee Report, however, states
that the May 1979 upper tier ceiling price averaged $13.02. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 37, at 92. The Senate Report also refers to the average May 1979 upper tier
ceiling price as equaling $13.02 per barrel. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 35. These reports
imply that Congress intended that the average May 1979 upper tier base price of $13.02 be
used as the starting point for all base price determinations.
The base price for tier two oil is $15.20, I.R.C. § 4989(d), and the tier three base price
equals $16.55. Id
A special interim rule exists for determining the base price for oil sold as either tier two or
tier three oil before October 1, 1980. I.R.C. § 4989(d)(2). Under this interim rule the base
prices of tier two and tier three oil are the product of the highest posted field price for such oil
or, if there is no posted field price, the highest posted price from the nearest domestic oil field
producing similar oil, multiplied by a fraction, the denominator of which is $35 and the nu-
merator of which is $15.20 in the case of tier two oil and $16.55 in the case of tier three oil. Id
In no case can the interim base price be below the upper tier ceiling price for oil sold in May
1979 plus $1 in the case of tier two oil and plus $2 in the case of tier three oil. Id
49. I.R.C. § 4989(b). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4989-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980).
50. I.R.C. § 4989(b)(1).
51. 1d § 4989(c). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4989-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980). The
complication arises from adjusting the GNP price deflator for the second preceding calendar
quarter upward by multiplying it by a factor of 1.005 to the nth power, in which "n" equals the
number of complete calendar quarters commencing after September 30, 1979. Id.
52. I.R.C. § 4996(c). For a good discussion on the various forms of state severance tax
adjustments proposed, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, THE DESIGN OF A
WINDFALL PROFIT TAX 11-12 (1979).
53. A $30 per barrel world market price is assumed for two reasons. First, the actual
world market price is very close to $30 per barrel. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
Second, the Congressional Budget Office employed a $30 per barrel price assumption in all its
calculations on the revenue and production effects of a windfall profits tax. See CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at xvii n.2.
54. The state severance tax adjustment of 12.5% is assumed because that is the actual
severance tax rate in Louisiana and Alaska, - CONG. REC. S 18193 (daily ed. Dec. II, 1979)
(remarks of Senator Long).
55. The actual current annual inflation rate was chosen in order that the inflation adjust-
ment, as calculated by the Department of Treasury, could be employed.
profits tax on a barrel of oil produced in each of the three oil tiers
would be calculated as follows:
Tier Tier Tier
One Two Three
sales price $30 $30 $30
adjusted base price 56  ($11.22) ($15.49) ($16.96)
state severance tax
adjustment 57  ($2.35) ($1.82) ($1.63)
windfall profit 58  $16.43 $12.69 $11.41
applicable percentage5 9  x.70 x.60 X.30
amount of tax 60  $11.50 $ 7.61 $ 3.42
V. The Excise Tax on Independent Oil Producers
Under the Act independent oil producers are granted a pre-
ferred status.6' An independent oil producer is someone or some en-
56. The adjusted base price for each tier is calculated by multiplying the base price, see
note 48 supra, by the inflation adjustment, see note 50 supra.
57. The state severance tax adjustment for each tier of oil is the difference between the
state severance tax on the sales price and the state severance tax on the adjusted base price.
See note 52 and accompanying text supra. The state severance tax on the sales price is the
same for all three tiers, te., the sales price multiplied by the state severance tax rate. The state
severance tax on the adjusted base price varies for each tier because the adjusted base price
differs for each tier. See note 56 supra.
58. The windfall profit is calculated by subtracting the adjusted base price and the state
severance tax adjustment from the sales price. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
59. See notes 38-45 and accompanying text supra.
60. The effective tax rate on the sales price of tier one oil is 11.50/30 or-38%. The effec-
tive windfall profit tax rate on the sales price of a barrel of tier two oil is 7.61/30 or 25%. The
effective tax rate on the sales price of a barrel of tier three oil is 3.42/30 or 11%.
61. I.R.C. § 4987(b)(2). An independent producer is defined as someone who is entitled
to take percentage depletion under section 613A of the I.R.C. Id § 4992(b)(1). Thus, as the
Conference Committee Report states, in order to receive preferential treatment "a producer
must not be an oil or gas retailer or an oil refiner in the taxable period." CONFERENCE COM-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 109.
The grant of preferential treatment to the independent oil producers was first discussed in
the Senate. See - CONG. REC. S 17189 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1979) [introduction of amendment
842 to the windfall profits tax act]. Senator Bentsen introduced an amendment that would
have exempted the first 1,000 barrels per day of oil produced by an independent. Id. It was
argued that the 1,000 barrel per day exemption was justified because the independent produ-
cers drill 90% of the wildcat wells in the United States and find 75% of the new oil and gas
fields. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 138-40 (additional views of Senators Bentsen); Id
at 176 (supplemental views of Senators Boren and Wallop) - CONG. REC. S 17190 (daily ed.
Nov. 26, 1979) (remarks of Senator Bentsen); Id. at 17271 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1979) (remarks of
Senator Wallop). The statistics cited by the supporters of the exemption were supplied from
the testimony of the Independent Producers' Association before the Senate Committee on Fi-
nance. See HEARINGS ON THE CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFITS TAX ACT: BEFORE THE SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 187 (1979).
The arguments against granting the independent producers preferential treatment are
twofold: First, it is argued that the independents should not receive additional tax preferences
since they already "receive extraordinary advantages compared to oil companies because they
receive a percentage depletion allowance." - CONG. REC. S 17270 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1979)
(remarks of Senator Moynihan). Second, it is argued that preferential treatment for independ-
ents is not justifiable on the grounds that they are mom and pop operations that need a tax
subsidy in order to compete with the larger oil companies. Id at S 17274-77 (remarks of
Senator Ribicoff). Many independents have hundreds of millions of dollars in gross receipts,
an exceptionally high rate of return, and extraordinary cash-flow. Id.
tity that is only engaged in oil production, not oil refining nor oil
retailing.62 The independent oil producer receives preferential treat-
ment because he is granted a reduced rate on the first one thousand
barrels of combined tier one and tier two daily oil production.63 Ac-
cordingly, the rate imposed on qualifying tier one oil is fifty per-
cent,64 and the rate imposed on qualifying tier two oil is thirty
percent.65 If an independent's daily oil production exceeds one thou-
sand barrels a day, the one thousand barrels eligible for reduced
rates will come ratably from tier one and tier two oil production.66
The production in excess of one thousand barrels is taxed at the nor-
mal rates.6 7 In addition, independents receive no reduced tax rate on
the production of tier three oil.
68
Because the independents receive preferential treatment on the
first one thousand barrels of combined tier one and tier two oil pro-
duction, Congress enacted a provision that precludes inter-company
property transfers designed solely to obtain the preferential rates.
69
Under this provision, if an independent acquires a property that pro-
duces tier one or tier two oil from a major oil company, or from an
independent that produces more than one thousand barrels of oil a
day, all oil produced on the transferred property will be ineligible for
the preferential rates.7° Furthermore, to prevent the creation of arti-
ficial entities, each of which would be entitled to a preferential rate
on the first one thousand barrels of daily oil production, section
4992(e) of the Act provides that all related parties will be aggregated
and forced to share a single one thousand barrel preference.7 ' Ac-
cordingly, a related group is defined as a family, a group of con-
trolled corporations, a group of entities under common control, or a
family and all entities in which that family has a beneficial interest
of 50 percent or greater.72
The windfall profit tax imposed on an independent is calculated
in the same manner as it is for a major oil company, by multiplying
the amount of profit categorized as a windfall by the applicable tax
rate.7 3 For example, assume that the sales price of a barrel of oil is
62. I.R.C. § 4992(b). See also CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 39, at 109.
63. I.R.C. § 4987(b)(2). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4987.1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980).
64. Id
65. Id
66. Id § 4992(c)(2). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4987.1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23387 (1980).
67. I.R.C. § 4992(a). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4992-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23388 (1980).
68. I.R.C. § 4987(b)(3).
69. Id § 4992(d)(3). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4992-1(d)(3), at 45 Fed. Reg. 23388 (1980).
The only exceptions to this prohibition on property transfers are: (I) transfers of property at
death; (2) transfers when the beneficiaries of a trust are changed; and (3) any transfer in which
the transferor and the transferee are forced to share a single 1,000 barrel preference, Id
70. Id
71. Id § 4992(e).
72. Id
73. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
$30, that the state severance tax is 12.5%, that the inflation adjust-
ment is based on the current annual inflation rate,74 and that the
independent produced one thousand barrels of tier one oil and two
thousand barrels of tier two oil. Given these facts the windfall prof-
its tax would be calculated as follows:
Preferred Regular Preferred Regular
Tier One Tier Two Tier Two Tier Two
sales price7 5  $9,990 $20,010 $20,010 $39,990
adjusted base
price7 6  ($3,736) ($7,484) ($10,332) ($20,648)
state severance
tax adjustment 77  ($783) ($1,567) ($1,214) ($2,426)
windfall profit7 8  $5,471 $10,959 $8,464 $16,916
applicable
percentage 79  x.50 x.70 x.30 x.60
amount of tax 80  $2,736 $7,671 $2,539 $10,150
VI. Administrative Provisions
The administrative provisions of the Act are relatively straight-
forward. The first purchaser of any domestically produced barrel of
oil is required to withhold the amount of the windfall profit tax from
the purchase price.8 The amount withheld by-the purchaser is de-
termined on the basis of information supplied by the producer.82
74. For a discussion of why these particular assumptions are employed see notes 53-55
and accompanying text supra.
75. Sales price is determined by multiplying the number of barrels in each oil tier by the
assumed sales price of $30 per barrel. Because the Act provides that the barrels entitled to
preferred rates come proportionately from tier one and tier two, it is apparent that 333 barrels
of tier one oil are entitled to preferred treatment and 667 barrels of tier two oil are entitled to
preferred treatment (given the assumption of 1,000 barrels of tier one and 2,000 barrels of tier
two).
76. The adjusted base price per barrel of tier one and tier two oil was determined at note
56 supra. If you multiply the tier one and tier two adjusted base prices by the appropriate
number of barrels in each of the above listed oil tiers, you arrive at the computed number. See
note 75 supra.
77. The state severance tax adjustment per barrel of tier one and tier two oil was deter-
mined at note 57 supra. Multiply the tier one and tier two severance tax adjustment by the
number of barrels in each of the above listed tiers, i.e., 333 in preferred tier one, 667 in regular
tier one, 667 in preferred tier two, and 1,333 in regular tier two, to arrive at the computed
numbers.
78. Windfall profit is calculated by subtracting the adjusted base price and the state sev-
erance tax adjustment from the sales price. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
79. The applicable percentages or tax rates imposed on independent production are dis-
cussed at the text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
80. The effective tax rate on total tier one production is 34.6% of the sales price of a
barrel of tier one oil. This rate was calculated as follows: Total tax on tier one $2,736 + $7,671
= $10,407. $10,407/$30,000 (total sales price) = 34.6%. The effective tax rate on tier two
production, as a percentage of the sales price, is 21%, calculated as follows: Total tax on tier
two production is $2,539 + $10,150 = $12,689. $12,689/$60,000 (total sales price) = 21%.
81. I.R.C. § 4995(a). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4995.1(a), at 45 Fed. Reg. 23391 (1980).
82. I.R.C. § 4995(a)(2). This section provides that the purchaser will withhold an
amount that shall be determined on the basis of a certification furnished to the purchaser
under I.R.C. § 6050C. Id I.R.C. § 6050C requires a producer to furnish the purchaser with
The produceris required to provide the adjusted base price of the oil
purchased and the corresponding tier and category to which the oil
belongs.8 3 In the case of an integrated oil company, a constructive
sales price is imputed if no inter-company sales exist or refining is
likely to commence on the producing premises.8 4 The integrated
company must then withhold the tax based upon this imputed
price. 85
Although windfall profit tax returns must be filed quarterly and
once at the close of the year,8 6 payment of the tax is to be made by
independent producers within forty-five days after the calendar
month in which the oil was sold87 and twice a month by integrated
oil companies.88
VII. Miscellaneous Provisions
The Act contains three important provisions that do not fall into
any cognizable category. First, the windfall profit tax imposed on
the production of an oil property cannot exceed ninety percent of the
taxable income derived from that property.89 Under this section,
taxable income is computed without any deductions for depletion,
intangible drilling expenses, qualified tertiary injectant costs, or the
windfall profit tax.9" Additionally, the ninety percent limitation does
not apply for the purposes of withholding the windfall profits tax.9
Second, the windfall profits tax is deductible in calculating the fed-
eral income tax. 92 Last, the windfall profits tax terminates once the
total revenue obtained from the tax equals 227 billion dollars or in
the year 1990.
93
the adjusted base price of the oil sold, the tax tier to which the oil belongs, and any other
information the Secretary of the Treasury might require pursuant to regulation. I.R.C.
§ 6050C.
83. I.R.C. § 6050C. See note 28 supra.
84. Id § 4988(c).
85. Id § 4995(a). See also Temp. Reg. 150.4995-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23391 (1980).
86. I.R.C. § 4995(a)(5) & (6). The purchaser must make quarterly returns. Id Producers
must file annual returns. Temp. Reg. 150.4997-1, at 45 Fed. Reg. 23397 (1980).
87. I.R.C. § 4995(b).
88. Id
89. Id § 4988(b). This 90% net income limitation raises problems because it is calculated
with respect to a "property" and not with respect to the over all profitability of the oil produc-
ing entity. Even small oil companies usually own several oil producing properties. Even if one
oil property is producing oil at a profit substantial losses from other property may actually put
the producer in a net loss position. The windfall profits tax will still have to be paid, however,
on the oil produced from the "profitable" property. The possibility that an oil producer would
have to pay the windfall profits tax although in a loss position was even recognized by a
proponent of the tax. See - CONG. REC. S 17481-82 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1979) (remarks of
Senator Chaffee in response to queries from Senator Armstrong).
90. I.R.C. § 4988(b).
91. Id. § 4995(a)(2)(B).
92. Id § 4988(b).
93. Id § 4990.
VIII. Critique and Conclusion
The windfall profits tax is an excise tax and not a true excess
profits tax. As an excise tax, it does not take into account the actual
profitability of the oil industry. Conceivably, an oil company could
be in a loss position and still have to pay the windfall profits tax.
Such a result is preposterous; logic dictates that a tax on "windfall
profits" should only be imposed if profits in fact exist.
Because of this intrinsic structural defect, the Act should be
amended to reflect a true excess profits tax.94 For example, a seventy
percent tax rate should be imposed on those oil company profits that
are in excess of those profits sufficient to generate a twelve percent
rate of return on stockholder's equity.95 This true excess profits tax
would bear a complete correlation to the "excess" amounts of oil
company profits and could never render the absurd result of taxing a
loss corporation. 96 This needed amendment would also satisfy any
populist urge to preclude the oil companies from "profiteering," yet
at the same time foster continued energy production by permitting a
reasonable rate of return upon oil company investment.97
Notwithstanding any belief that the present excise tax is prefera-
ble to a true excess profits tax, several criticisms about the present
Act remain. The present Act is exceedingly complex. 98 Accordingly,
the complexity of an excise windfall profits tax has led some com-
mentators to suggest that a windfall profits tax should not be en-
acted.99 Instead, these commentators suggest that the tax subsidies
presently accorded the oil industry, such as percentage depletion and
the option to immediately expense intangible drilling costs, be elimi-
nated. " The elimination of these tax subsidies would generate sub-
stantial tax revenue and would simplify, rather than complicate, the
Internal Revenue Code.
t0 '
Additionally, placing an excise tax on newly discovered oil is
not in keeping with the underlying purposes of the Act. 10 2 The ra-
tionale behind the Act is that once the price of oil is decontrolled the
oil industry will reap a windfall when the price of oil rises to the
94. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra (discussion of what constitutes a true
windfall profits tax).
95. This form of true excess profits tax has already been suggested. See note 8 supra.
96. A loss corporation could not be subject to the excess profits tax because payment of
the tax would be conditional on profit generated and not, as in the present windfall profits tax,
on sales made.
97. For a discussion concerning what constitutes a reasonable rate of return, see SENATE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 147-49 (additional views of Senator Gravel).
98. See note 2 supra.
99. HOUSE HEARINGS OF 1974 supra note 7, at 637-41 (statement of Gerard M. Bran-
non); Id. at 803-04 (statement of Robert M. Brandon, Director of Tax Reform Research
Group).
100. HOUSE HEARINGS OF 1974 supra note 7, at 803-04.
101. Id
102. See note 45 supra.
world level."°3 Placing a tax on newly discovered oil, however, does
not follow this rationale since no windfall can be had on oil that was
never controlled." ° Finally, an excise tax should not be placed on
incremental tertiary oil and heavy oil. The production of tertiary oil
and heavy oil requires high cost technologies. Thus, unless a large
amount of revenue is retained by the producers of these types of oil,
no incentive to continue production will exist because the companies
will be unable to recoup their investment.
The complexity of the Act, its design as an excise tax rather than
as a true excess profits tax, and the failure to take into account some
basic oil economics, all militate against a favorable review. In fact,
in its present form the Act operates contrary to both principles of
equity and economics.
103. Id
104. Id

